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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT AND THE AGING ATHLETE
AFTER CASEY MARTIN
ALISON M. BARNEs*
In 1990, an overwhelming bipartisan vote in the U.S. Congress' en-
acted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),2 a strong antidis-
crimination statement tracing its origins from the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, na-
tional origin and sex. 3 The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability in employment,4 government programs and facilities,5 and pub-
lic accommodations.6 It calls for many types of accommodations7 for
people with disabilities to allow them to participate in the mainstream of
life8 with non-disabled people.
In 2001, the Supreme Court took a controversial step in applying the
ADA to professional sports participants in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,9
ruling that disabled golfer Casey Martin is permitted to use a golf cart to
play in PGA Tour tournaments despite prohibiting rules, as a reasonable
* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. This article was originally
presented by the author at the National Sports Law Institute Conference, Disability Issues in
Sports Law conducted on April 16, 1999.
1. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA.
L. Rnv. 18-27, 27 n.2 and accompanying text (The Senate voted 93.8%, and the House 93.1%,
in favor of the ADA.).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 1, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended
in 5 U.S.C. §§ 2204(32), 2205; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(d); and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a-1975d, 1981-1997,
2000a-2000h).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994) [hereinafter Title I]. See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-
1630.16 (2001).
5. Id. §§ 12131-12165 (1994) [hereinafter Title II]. See also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-35.999
(2001).
6. Id. §§ 12181-12189 (1994) [hereinafter Title III]. See also 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101-36.608
(2001).
7. Accommodations to enable a person with a disability to participate generally include
auxiliary aids and services; physical access to facilities; job restructuring; modifications of ex-
aminations; and modifications of programs, practices, and procedures.
8. Under Title III, for example, discrimination includes denial of participation in or bene-
fit from goods or services, etc., participation of unequal benefit, or providing a separate bene-
fit. 28 C.F.R. § 36.202(a)-(c). See infra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
9. 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). PGA is the frequently referred to acronym for Professional
Golfers' Association.
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accommodation that a person with a disability may require by law from a
public accommodation.' ° Many sports lovers were outraged"1 for rea-
sons that seem to reflect two related values: The sanctity of sports rules
for the sake of tradition and gamesmanship, 12 and the rejection of this
antidiscrimination law enforced by litigation as the means to determine
exceptions to sports rules.1 3 Some assert that the Martin opinion is lim-
10. 29 C.F.R. § 36.104.
Facility means all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment,
rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other
real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or
equipment is located.... Place of public accommodation means a facility, operated by
a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the
following categories [twelve types of places and services sites follow].
Id.
11. See, e.g., David Broder, Denigrated Hit - What if Ruling is Applied to Baseball?, MIL-
WAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 3, 2001, at J3 (asserting that the designated hitter rule of the
American League might, under the Casey Martin ruling, be forced upon the National League
by "some smart lawyer" for an aging "slugger" who can no longer run the bases). See also
Paul M. Anderson, Spoiling a Good Walk: Does the ADA Change the Rules of Sport?, 1 VA. J.
SPORTS & L. 44, 85 (1999) (golf organizations are "loathe to admit that the ADA does apply"
even after Martin and a similar case, Olinger v. United States. Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th
Cir. 1998), vacated by, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001)); See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Thomas A. Bowden, Shame on Casey Martin, AYN RAND INSTrITUTE (Jan. 11.
2001), at http://www.aynrand.orglmedialink/martin_case.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2001)
(analogizing the Martin claim to Tonya Harding's clubbing of Nancy Kerrigan's knee prior to
the winter Olympics of 1994, and asserting that the PGA should have an absolute right to set
its own rules, and that spectators should be able to see only the ablest athletes).
Many letters to the editor reflected the intent to exclude persons with disabilities. See, e.g.,
Wes Johnson, Letters, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., June 1, 2001, at 23A ("Every one of [the Supreme
Court justices] missed the point. It is not for Casey Martin, you, or me to decide whether he
can ride in a cart in a PGA event. We can debate how we would decide if we ran the PGA or
what we would prefer the PGA do, but the federal government should have no jurisdiction
over the rules of play in a public or private business." The writer finds the fault to lie with the
Congress, the ADA, and the courts that are not serving to check and balance each others'
powers as intended by the framers.); Capital Gang (CNN television broadcast, June 2, 2001)
("[T]he kind of rules we want the court looking at are not the rules of golf."): Mary Bugeia,
Has Court Leveled Golfs Playing Field, THE DETROIT NEWS, June 11, 2001, at 8 (asserting
that walking is an aspect of the game, and that the rules of the Senior Golf Tournament allow
the option not to walk to adjust for needs of older players. The author observes that she
walked the course while Gary Player golfed, and observed that he sometimes had to lie down
on the grass to ease back pain. However, she observes, he did not ask for changes in the rules
of the game.). One wonders what Gary Player might have done if the rules prohibited lying
down on the course.
13. See, e.g., Rick Telander, Sports Court Trouble: Will Fallout from Casey Martin Ruling
Disable Our Games?, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, May 30, 2001, at 94 (asking whether sports rules
more accommodating to the handicapped will clog golf courses, who will pay the costs, and
whether sports organizations will shut down rather than pay or change). Asserting that such
results arise from fear of liability, the author notes the absence of "large slides, big swings....
high-speed merry-go-rounds" from playgrounds as results of fear of liability. Id.
THE AGING ATHLETE
ited to its peculiar facts, which include PGA and other golf rules that
allow the use of carts in most tournaments and qualifying rounds, and
Casey Martin's widely acknowledged and severe disability,'4 while
others responded positively to the application of non-discrimination
principles to a human endeavor of a high order.'"
The changes in progress in law and society as illustrated and ad-
vanced in the Martin decision have important implications for the future,
as a growing proportion of athletes are persons with disabilities. Specifi-
caUy, numbered among disabled competitors over the next thirty years
will be many members of the babyboomer age cohort,' 6 as the oldest
among them begins to reach the traditional retirement age of sixty-five
in 2010, and to accumulate the chronic disabilities often attending later
life.' 7 This age group, far larger in number than those born before them
in the Great Depression and World War II years, or in the contraceptive-
conscious late 1960s and 1970s, has been identified for a number of traits
that seem to arise from their sheer numbers (which caused a nationwide
industry of elementary school building in the 1950s and was a significant
factor in the youth-oriented culture of the late 1960s and 1970s) and the
intense interest their more mature and indulgent parents took in their
interests and wishes. 8 Some assert 'boomers' show a self-interested re-
fusal to "act their age;"' 9 that 'boomers' assert, perhaps due to sheer
numbers in the population, revised views of the course of life and its
14. Tom Jackson, Supreme Court's Ruling Means Golf is No Sovereign Nation, TAMPA
TRrn., June 3, 2001, at 9 (challenging the PGA's view that the Martin ruling fits no other facts,
while noting that it is possible for quarterbacks who fear brain damage to bring suit under the
ADA to require additional blocking help and challenge the eleven player squad as "capri-
cious"). But see John Feinstein, Ruling Could Create Big Lines for Carts at the Golf Course,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 2, 2001, at 13A (citing sports players with debilitating condi-
tions who might require some favorable treatment, including "a wheelchair-bound three point
shooter [who] would have the right under the ADA to play in the National Basketball Associ-
ation if someone wanted to use him").
15. See, e.g., Tom Kensler, Golf Notes: Martin is Welcome in Colorado, DENVER POST,
June 7, 2001, at D12 (noting that the Colorado Open allows the use of carts by all players and
that players with disabilities can be invited provided only that they enhance the field).
16. Babyboomers are variously described as those born between 1946 and 1964, or 1947
and 1965, many of whom are born to returning servicemen and their spouses as they establish
households and begin families delayed by the separation dictated by the work of war.
17. Alison Barnes, Envisioning a Future for Age and Disability Discrimination, 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2002).
18. Among defining works on the babyboom generation are LANDON Y. JONES, GREAT
EXPECrATIONS: AMERICA AND THE BABY BOOM GENERATION (1980) and JERRY GERBER ET
AL., LwIETRENDs: THE FUTURE OF BABY BOOMERS AND OTHER AGING AMERICANS (1989).
19. See generally LANDON Y. JONES, GREAT ExPEcrAnONS: AMERICA AND THE BABY
BOOM GENERATION (1980); JERRY GERBER ET AL., LIFETRENDS: THE FUTURE OF BABY
BOOMERS AND OTHER AGING AMERICANS (1989).
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traditional obligations.2° Also, babyboomers often compete fiercely, a
trait learned in order to succeed on the crowded life stage shared with
their peers, both in business and in the youth-pursuing venues of sport."1
These generalizations, while true of no specific 'boomer,' suggest that
this age cohort will seek to hold its place in the mainstream rather than
choose genteel retirement from activities pursued throughout a lifetime.
Since many engage in competitive sports either as daily routine or vaca-
tion recreation, babyboomers are likely to seek to continue their sports
participation despite accumulating disabilities.2
The Court's decision in favor of Casey Martin and the reaction from
athletes, commentators and the public, calls for examination of the
ADA's role vis-A-vis sporting rules and people with disabilities who wish
to compete. 3 This essay explores the possible implications of the ADA
and Martin in the future of sports, particularly during the extended old
age of the babyboomers. First, it will review the facts and some implica-
tions of the Martin decision. Second, it will discuss the ADA in the con-
text of other anti-discrimination law, and propose reasons that regulated
parties, including sports organizations, may be especially skeptical about
the requirement for accommodation of people with disabilities. The dis-
cussion next moves to the likely disabilities and interests of the
babyboomers as older athletes. Fourth, the article reviews ways in which
sports already take into account differences between competitors in or-
der to create circumstances for fair competition between unlike persons,
examples of the voluntary accommodation of disabled athletes that
tends to show the nature of non-fundamental changes in sports rules,
20. Even recent harshly critical assessment of babyboomer traits, written by 'boomer au-
thors, involves the 'boomers' self-absorption, rather than moving on in the traditional course
of past generations. See, e.g., Alex Kuczynski, A Caustic Look In the Mirror From Boomers.
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,2001, at C1 (reviewing authors who assert that 'boomers are misguided in
their self-regard and self-involvement). Indeed, the self-loathing of the babyboomer authors
who are reviewed might be yet another form of self-regard.
21. Id. Of course, more young adults also survive trauma and disease that would in an
earlier time have been fatal, and often have lifelong chronic conditions that limit the ways in
which they can perform major life activities. Their commitment to athletic and other competi-
tion is beyond the scope of this article.
22. See infra notes 113-144 and accompanying text.
23. In order to draw attention to the fleeting nature of non-disabled status and affirm the
perception that disability is a normal state varying primarily in terms of degree, disability
advocates use the acronym TABs for "temporarily able-bodied" persons. For a scathing inter-
pretation of the use of the term, see Bowden, supra note 12, at http://www.aynrand.org/media
link/martincase.shtml (asserting that the ADA was "designed by disability advocates who
resentfully describe healthy people as 'temporarily abled,"' preventing employers from hiring
able persons, firing disabled persons, and incurring costs for ramps and sign language
interpreters).
[Vol. 12:67
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and the possible evolution of sports and society to allow principled ac-
commodation of athletes with disabilities, in keeping with the letter and
spirit of the ADA.
I. THE LEGEND OF CASEY MARTIN
Casey Martin is the first plaintiff to use the ADA to assert the right
to an accommodation to allow him to compete in professional golf.24 In
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.' Martin had won a preliminary injunction
from the district court for the 2000 PGA Tournament allowing him to
use a cart in the third stage of qualifying rounds.26 The PGA, in re-
sponse to the order, allowed all participants in the round to use carts and
about twenty did so. The order also allowed Martin to use a cart on two
Nike Tour tournaments, one of which he won.27 The PGA sought a sum-
mary judgment from the magistrate judge in the final disposition.28 The
judge considered a number of issues later addressed by the Supreme
Court, including the PGA's status as a private club and whether the
PGA is an employer or a public accommodation with regard to Martin.
The magistrate held that the PGA is a public accommodation and that
the use of a cart was a reasonable accommodation for Casey Martin.
The PGA appealed for Supreme Court review.29
24. For a review of athlete accommodation cases prior to Martin, especially college rule
changes to allow extended eligibility for athletes with learning disabilities, see Anderson,
supra note 11, at 51-73. The PGA has included golfers with physical impairments in tourna-
ments in the past. Notably, Ed Furgol won the U.S. Open without accommodation for a
withered left arm, which might have made him a person with a disability under the ADA. In
1987, golfers Charlie Owens and Lee Elder apparently were first to ask the PGA for permis-
sion to use a cart. Both were denied. Id. at 76-77.
25. 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998), affJd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 121 S. Ct.
1879 (2001).
26. Id. at 1322.
27. Anderson, supra note 11, at 233-35 (citing Cameron Morfit, Winning a la Cart; While
Preparing to Fight the Tour for the Right to Ride, Casey Martin Won the Nike Opener, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 19, 1998, at G6).
28. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. For commentary, see also Christopher M. Parent, Note,
Martin v. PGA Tour: A Misapplication of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 J. LEGIs. 123
(2000).
29. Two other professional golfers have sought ADA relief. Ford Olinger, who was de-
nied permission of the United States Golf Association to use a cart, won a temporary re-
straining order allowing him to use a cart to compete in a qualifying round for the 1998 U.S.
Open. When he failed to qualify, he sought and was denied USGA permission to use a cart in
the 1999 qualifying rounds. Olinger sued in the federal district court, which ruled that a cart
can give an advantage over players without carts, and thus is a fundamental change to the
game that cannot be imposed on the USGA. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp.
2d 926, 937 (N.D. Ind. 1999), affd, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated by 121 S. Ct. 2212
(2001). The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion full of golf lore but short on legal reasoning, ac-
2001]
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The issues of the case are examined here in the order in which the
arguments typically proceed, beginning with the plaintiff's prima facie
case, through the defendant's denial of jurisdiction, to the shift in the
burden of proof to the defendant to show non-discriminatory reasons for
its action. The ADA requires first that a plaintiff be a person with a
disability, defined in pertinent part as one who has "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the individual's ma-
jor life activities."3" Though a point of contention that resulted in new
Supreme Court interpretation in 2000,31 Martin's disability was not ques-
tioned by the PGA or by the Court. His pain and risk from walking with
Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disor-
der that obstructs the flow of blood from his right leg back to his heart,
has been well documented. Thus, Martin avoided the hostile scrutiny
that preoccupied the Court in other recent cases.
A plaintiff next must show that he is qualified to participate in the
benefit or sought-after activity. Martin showed he was qualified by par-
ticipating successfully in the required preliminary play, termed Q-
school.3 2 However, a legal question remained regarding what legally
protected role Martin qualified for. Here, the Court had to choose be-
tween Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability by an employer; Title III, which prohibits discrimination by the
owners and operators of public accommodations; and non-suit because
the PGA is neither of these types of entities.3
The Court chose the literal lack of employer-employee relations be-
tween Martin as a pro golfer and the PGA. In doing so, it emphasized
knowledged the validity of Olinger's arguments on appeal but stated that it was not necessary
for the USGA to evaluate Olinger's request to waive the walking rule. See generally Olinger,
205 F.3d 1001. Rather, the decision and its process was left to the USGA. Id. at 1007.
The lack of clarity in the reasoning leaves room for doubt that there was a split in the
Circuit Courts. On the similarities and differences in the Martin and Olinger circuit court
opinions, see Michael Waterstone, Let's Be Reasonable Here: Why the ADA Will Not Ruin
Professional Sports. 2000 BYU L. REv. 1489, 1520-24.
The other known suit was brought by JaRo Jones, who sought to use a cart in the Senior
Open qualifying rounds. Jones has the effects of polio. Id. at 1531 n.180 (citing Jim Vertuno,
Yahoo! Sports Headlines, available at http://dailynews.yahoo.comth/ap/20000501/sp/glf._dis-
abledlawsuit-l.html (last visited May 1, 2000)).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
31. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
32. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1884 nn.1-2 (describing ways of qualifying, including Q-school).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The statute prohibits denial of participation through contractual
and other business relations and denial of opportunity to benefit from the public accommoda-
tion's goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; participation of
unequal benefit: and providing a separate benefit unless necessary to provide the person with
a disability with goods, services, or opportunities as effective as those provided to others.
[Vol. 12:67
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all the ways the golfer's relationship with the PGA differs from employ-
ment, in that he was not required to participate in any particular tourna-
ment, only to play in a minimum number of them.34
The Court chose instead, following the Ninth Circuit, to characterize
the PGA as a public accommodation governed under ADA Title III.
Public accommodations are defined in ADA regulation in an extensive
but nonexclusive list of types of private entities providing goods and ser-
vices to the public.35 The list includes a golf course,36 but of course the
PGA is not and does not operate the golf courses at which its tourna-
ments are held. Thus, relying on Title III in Martin poses definitional
problems, as did Title I.
In deciding the PGA is a public accommodation, the Court rejected
the organization's argument that it is a private club subject to an excep-
tion from compliance with the ADA.37 Rather, it adopted the reasoning
of the magistrate judge below that the PGA should be considered a com-
mercial enterprise, and that a portion of a golf course - specifically, the
areas of play - could not be an exception to the characterization of the
course38 because such a distinction would open the door to intentional
discrimination. The type of public accommodation specifically recog-
nized by the ADA that applies to the PGA is "a place of exhibition or
entertainment. '39 The reasoning requires that professional golfers be
the "clients and customers" of the PGA. The PGA argued, in contrast,
that the golfers are producers of the entertainment, like actors in a thea-
ter production.4n
34. An excellent reason to avoid Title I in Martin is the EEOC's view of the range of jobs
available to a prospective plaintiff. In 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i), the EEOC provides that a
person is substantially limited in the activity of work if "significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." Id. Under this standard,
Casey Martin might be considered qualified for many jobs that do not require any significant
walking, and might be readily hireable when taking into account the factors the EEOC would
consider. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
35. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. "Public accommodation means a private entity that owns, leases
(or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." Id.
36. Id.
37. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1886 n.10. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12187; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (private
club under the ADA is defined by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and is exempt from Title III
requirements).
38. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1886.
39. Id. at 1891 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(c)).
40. Id. The argument, of course, specifically suggests that Martin would have only a Title
I employee's claim, the PGA's preferred view.
2001]
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The Court based its conclusion on the observation that any member
of the public who competes successfully in qualifying rounds or Q-
school, and provides two references, can proceed without further screen-
ing to compete in PGA tournaments. The PGA's reasoning that it had
spectators as customers who could be distinguished from the players did
not preclude the players from being clients or customers as well.
Once Martin establishes his prima facie case - that he is a qualified
person with a disability subject to the protection of the ADA and has
suffered from negative action such as exclusion or failure to reasonably
accommodate41 a disability - the defendant PGA must offer nondiscrim-
inatory reasons for its apparently prohibited action. The PGA as a pub-
lic accommodation is required under the ADA to avoid imposing
eligibility criteria that tend to screen out a person with a disability from
full and equal enjoyment of its goods or services unless necessary in or-
der to provide the goods or services; to make reasonable modifications
in policies and practices when necessary to afford the goods or services
to a person with a disability, unless the modification would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the goods or services; and to ensure that no per-
son with a disability is excluded because of the absence of auxiliary aids
and services, unless such changes would fundamentally alter the nature
of the goods or services or impose an undue burden on the public
accommodation.42
Since the policy of excluding carts at the final stage of PGA competi-
tion is not clearly necessary to enable play, and the provision of widely
available golf carts to prevent Martin from being excluded is not an un-
due burden,43 the strongest argument is that the use of carts is a funda-
41. The nature of a reasonable accommodation sought by an ADA plaintiff is frequently
at the core of litigation, especially in long term relationships such as employment and Martin's
relationship with the PGA. There is no issue here since only the rule prevents the use of a
single cart which, of course, is readily available and no undue burden to the PGA. water-
stone, supra note 29, at 1521 (clarifying that the plaintiff faces only the relatively light burden
of showing that an accommodation is "reasonable in a general sense," with more required
later if the defendant fails to show that the accommodation is a fundamental change or an
undue burden) (citing Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spotzl Brewery. 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir.
1997)).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i-iii). The difference in the requirements with regard to
the three "specific prohibitions" in this section are not clear and may occasionally be signifi-
cant. That is, eligibility criteria cannot tend to screen out unless necessary, policies and proce-
dures must be altered unless it would result in a fundamental alteration of the goods, and steps
must be taken to avoid exclusion or segregation because of absence of auxiliary aids and
services unless remedial steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods or services or
result in undue burden. One source of confusion is the fact that a requested accommodation
might fall into more than one category.
43. 28 C.F.R § 36.104.
[Vol. 12:67
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mental alteration of the game of golf at the level of tournament play in
which the rules exclude carts. Thus, the PGA did not dispute that the
use of a cart by Casey Martin was a reasonable accommodation.44 It
asserted instead in response to the demand for the reasonable accommo-
dation of a cart that such a change in the rule would be a fundamental
alteration to the game of golf.45
Seeking the fundamental or essential aspects of the game of golf, the
Court considered three applicable sets of rules regarding tour events: the
"Rules of Golf," the "Conditions of Competition and Local Rules" gov-
erning PGA professional tours, and "Notices to Competitors" which are
issued for particular events. The Rules of Golf do not prohibit the use of
carts.46 The "Conditions" (also called the "hard card") require PGA
Tour golfers to walk unless permitted to ride, and carts are allowed for
preliminary rounds, but not during extensive tournament rounds.47
Since 1997, carts are not permitted in the final round of the qualifying Q-
school, in order to replicate as closely as possible the conditions of tour-
nament play. The hard card permits the use of carts throughout the Se-
nior PGA Tour for golfers fifty and older.48
(1) Undue burden means significant difficulty or expense. In determining whether an
action would result in an undue burden, factors to be considered include -
(2) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part;
(3) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in the action; the num-
ber of persons employed by the site; the effect on expenses and resources; legiti-
mate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation, including crime
prevention measures; or the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of
the site;
(4) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of the
site or sites in question to any parent corporation or entity;
(5) If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent corporation or entity; the
overall size of the parent corporation or entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(6) If applicable, the type of operation or operations, of any parent corporation or
entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the
parent corporation or entity.
Id.
44. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1893.
45. Id.
46. An appendix suggests that, if desired, players might be required to walk the course.
Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1884-85.
47. Interestingly, the USGA Senior Tour apparently restricts the use of carts during the
qualifying rounds but allows them in tournaments. Waterstone, supra note 29, at 1531. The
reversal from the PGA rule suggests either that the rules are indeed arbitrary, or that a signifi-
cant purpose is the pace of Senior Tour play. That is, senior golfers might be required to walk
in qualifying rounds to show they are in generally good physical condition, but can use carts in
the tournament because their walking might slow the pace of play.
48. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1885.
2001]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
While some intention to regulate the use of carts was apparent, the
Court found the actual practices and reasons to lack the coherence that
might have made the exclusion of carts fundamental to the game when
played at the highest professional tournament level. The Court focused
first on the reasons advanced by the PGA for excluding carts. It asserted
that "the key is to have everyone tee off on the first hole under exactly
the same conditions and all of them be tested over that 72-hole event
under the conditions that exist during those four days of the event."49
On the contrary, the Court pointed out, it is impossible to assure the
same conditions while teeing off and playing on different holes, because
of changes in the winds and weather." The Court considered pure
chance to be at least as likely to affect the outcome of the game.
The other significant reason advanced by the PGA to prohibit carts is
in order to introduce a fatigue factor into final tournament play.5 Such
golf legends as Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus testified, emphasizing
the importance of fatigue to concentration and accuracy in shot-making.
Particular golf tournaments in 1950 and 1964 with physically arduous
conditions were cited from Olinger v. United States Golf Association.2
The Court gathered contrary information and testimony from the re-
cord. A professor of physiology and expert on fatigue testified that the
actual expenditure of energy in walking the course was modest, and that
psychological factors are more likely to affect tournament play. 3 The
behavior of golfers given the option of using a cart or walking was very
significant. Senior Tour members generally declined to use carts54 as did
Q-School members given permission to ride because of Martin's injunc-
tion. Tournament level golfers testified that walking is preferable in
order to "keep in rhythm, stay warmer when it is chilly, and develop a
better sense of the elements and the course. 56
The PGA could not argue against Martin's use of a cart on the basis
of the risk of unmanageable numbers of others seeking the same excep-
tion. In three years since Martin requested a cart, no one else had sued
the PGA, and only two golfers had sued the United States Golf Associa-
49. Id. (citing UNITED STAT[ES GOLF Ass'N & ANCIENT GOLF CLUB OF SCOTLAND,
RULES OF GOLF, at App. 192 (2000) [hereinafter RULES OF GOLF]).
50. Id. at 1895.
51. Id. at 1887.
52. 205 F.3d 1001, 1006-07.
53. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1896.
54. Id. at 1896 n.49.
55. Id. at 1896.
56. Id.
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tion (USGA).5 7 More significantly, the Court cited the ADA require-
ment that an individual's request for an accommodation be individually
evaluated. The Court found that Martin expended more energy with a
cart, which still required twenty-five percent of the walking, than non-
disabled golfers expend in walking the whole course. Thus his perform-
ance in the fundamental activity of shot-making was not unfairly im-
proved by the accommodation.58
II. THE REACH OF THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court recalled the purpose of the ADA to remedy circumstances
of people with disabilities who are isolated by intentional or negligent
discrimination, and bring them into the economic and social mainstream
of American life.59 A number of aspects of the decision serve to clarify
the extent of ADA coverage of sports participation.
A. The definition of a public accommodation should be given broad
scope, given the language of the statute and regulations.60
Martin initially argued alternatively for claims under Title I and Title
III, but the argument received little discussion because the relationship
of professional golfers to the PGA is that of independent contractors.6'
However, the result was not necessarily clear from the facts, and a con-
trary argument, at least theoretically, could have carried the day.62 Rela-
tionships other than that of employer and employee have been
considered sufficient for Title I causes of action provided the plaintiff
undergo exclusion or discriminatory treatment similar to that which
might result from employment discrimination.63 The courts might have
considered the fact that Martin's income, if any, would come from the
PGA's prize money, and that he had to appear at the appointed times
and work (i.e., play golf) in order to generate income. Indeed, the viabil-
57. See generally supra note 29.
58. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897 (citing Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252).
59. Id. at 1889 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2) -(3); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 20 (1989);
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332).
60. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
61. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1891 nn.26-28.
62. It appears that Justice Scalia in his dissent (with Justice Thomas) would have consid-
ered Martin an employee of the PGA, when he asserts that tournament qualifications are
meant to "hire" golfers for PGA tournaments.
63. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12 (1st
Cir. 1994) (holding that an employee health benefits plan covering the owner and president of
a company was subject to Title I though no employment relationship existed, because the plan
has the sort of control over benefits usually held by an employer).
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ity of Martin's Title III claim does not close the door on Title I claims by
athletes with different arguments and different relationships.
An excellent reason to avoid Title I in Martin is the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation view of the range of
jobs available to a prospective plaintiff which provides that a person is
substantially limited in the activity of work if significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills, and abilities.64 Under this standard, Casey Martin might
be considered qualified for many jobs that do not require any significant
walking, and might be readily hireable when taking into account the spe-
cific factors the EEOC would consider.65 Even if he were considered
only for golf-related work, because of his training, he might be qualified
for teaching, writing, or sportscasting, and so forth.66
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this characterization is its en-
dorsement of a somewhat expansive concept of a public accommodation.
The circuit courts are split on whether a public accommodation must be
a physical place to be modified and "accessed" by persons with disabili-
ties, or whether any "place" where business is transacted can be a public
accommodation that may require modification under the ADA.67
Clearly, the Martin opinion relies on the list of categories of public ac-
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
65. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). Another reason to allow Martin to continue is the investment he
has already made to participate in the Tour. In employment qualification contexts, courts
have expressed concern for the plaintiff who has invested personally and professionally in
order to qualify for a position only to be defeated by the final qualification barriers. Profes-
sional exams, including bar exams and medical boards are good examples. See, e.g., Bartlett v.
New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing plaintiff
Bartlett to qualify for admission to the bar though she is apparently unable to read well
enough to pass the test, because she "struggled through laborious years of law school - at no
small fiscal or psychic cost." Id. at 1124.).
66. But see, Waterstone, supra note 29, at 1548 (asserting that an athlete who is being
discriminated against may have no other viable career options because often athletes have no
competing employers to who they can offer their skills and receive accommodation for their
handicap).
67. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (holding that public accommodations
are not limited to actual physical structures, and that a health benefits plan offered through a
trade association may be subject to Title III); contra Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 121
F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a public accommodation must be a physical place, and
therefore a employee long-term disability plan was not covered under Title III). Interestingly,
Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin dissented on Parker, asserting that the majority
misconstrued Stoutenborough v. National Football League, 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1028 (1995), written by Martin, in which the court held that the conditions of
broadcast of an National Football League (NFL) game could not serve to subject the NFL to a
claim under Title III. He asserts that the intent was to confine the choices of public accommo-
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commodations,68 as required by the statute, but suggests that the list will
be interpreted to include a broad spectrum of sites where commercial
activity is transacted.
B. Sports even at the highest professional level are not so selective that
the ADA cannot apply.
The Court extends the reach of the ADA to professional sports
rather than endorsing the idea that such activity requires a level of skill
or such selectivity that some sports organizations might be exempt. The
Martin facts underscore the law's application to professional tourna-
ments, since only tournament play was subject to a no-cart restriction.
The Court clearly rejects the idea that identifying the healthiest, strong-
est and generally most capable competitor is the purpose of any specific
sport. Rather, the sport is likely to be defined by its existing rules in
order to identify by competition the person most capable at the specific
activities fundamental to that sport.
The Court confirms the need to comply with all the ADA require-
ments at the highest level of the sport, calling for engaging in an evalua-
tion of the individual's ability to fulfill the fundamental or essential
requirements of the sport, unless the law recognizes a reason the evalua-
dations to the list provided in the statute, but that the list itself leaves the possibility of claims
against private places doing business with the public which are not physical places.
68. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. The list includes:
(1) An inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging;
(2) A restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(3) A motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibi-
tion or entertainment;
(4) An auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(5) A bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
sales or rental establishment;
(6) A laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, phar-
macy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or
other service establishment;
(7) A terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(8) A museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(9) A park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(10) A nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school,
or other place of education;
(11) A day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(12) A gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course or other place of exercise or
recreation.
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tion is too burdensome. 69 The possibility that individual assessment it-
self is too burdensome apparently would require a defendant to show
very onerous circumstances, and perhaps that such evaluation is
impossible.7 °
C. Fundamental rules of a sport are derived most reliably from written
rules that apply to all. Unwritten but widely observed rules and rules
that are not uniformly applied may then be persuasive.
In order to determine what is fundamental to golf, the Court looked
first to the "Rules of Golf," jointly written by the USGA and the Royal
and Ancient Golf Club of Scotland, which apply to professionals and
amateurs.71 The Rules provide that players may at times be required to
walk, but give no instruction as to why this might be invoked.72 The
Court next reviewed the written rules for PGA professional tours,73
which require walking the course during tournaments. Exceptions are
provided, however, for the Senior Tour of players fifty and older.74 Fi-
nally, the Court reviewed the written notices issued to competitions in
particular tournaments, which authorize the use of carts when there is
unusual distance between a green and the next tee.75
The Court finds in the Rules of Golf the fundamental activities of
"using clubs to cause a ball to progress from the teeing ground to a hole
some distance away with as few strokes as possible."76 It finds, however,
that the walking requirement, which is absent from the two principal sets
of rules and is "buried in an appendix to the Rules of Golf," is not funda-
mental. 77 Further, it is not fundamental to tournament play, since the
69. But see, Waterstone, supra note 29, at 1526-29 (arguing that the Court provided no
clear rule for distinguishing whether an individual assessment must always be conducted, and
asserting that rules of sport exist that are fundamental for all participants and therefore can
end the inquiry without need for individual analysis).
70. The only language in Title III that relates to the standards for an individual analysis
appear in 28 C.F.R. § 36.208. This section defines "Direct Threat," as one that must be deter-
mined by individual assessment "based on reasonable judgment that relies on ... the best
available objective evidence, to ascertain ...whether reasonable modifications of policies,
practices, or procedures will [solve the problem]." Id. Thus, an individual evaluation of a
person with a disability will be based on the best available objective evidence regarding the
nature of the person's capabilities, the essential activities the person wishes to engage in, and
the effectiveness and burden of the accommodations sought.
71. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1884.
72. Id. at 1885.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Martin. 121 S. Ct. at 1893-94.
77. Id. at 1895.
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PGA allows carts to be used at its discretion in any tour, and routinely
allows carts in Senior PGA Tour tournaments.78
The Court then considers some implied rules or elements of the game
according to the PGA Tour, including the organizers' intention that all
golfers tee off and play the course "under exactly the same conditions"7 9
and that the walking requirement exists in order to include in tourna-
ment play the element of player fatigue. 0 The evidence included de-
tailed, conflicting testimony and statistical evidence of player choices,81
and finds that the use of the cart does not reliably provide an advantage
to a golfer. Further, golfers reported that their ability to place their
shots is improved if they are aware of air and ground conditions through
walking, and the fact that more golfers walked than rode when the op-
tion was available.
The use of the written rules might be considered a lawyerly emphasis,
or overemphasis, inappropriate to sport. On the other hand, the rules
are considered in the context of evidence of intention, ongoing practice,
and a general perception about what is important about the game. The
Martin opinion also suggests that fundamental activities are those that
result in winning, or scoring, i.e., the skills that make a good competitor,
rather than skills that merely enhance the organization, pace or manage-
ment of the game or competition.
D. Appropriate judicial scrutiny extends to a detailed examination of
the facts underlying the legal determination, given the ADA requirement
of individual assessment of the qualifications of the individual and an
interactive process between the public accommodation and the qualified
individual with a disability to determine any appropriate
reasonable accommodation.
82
The section above shows the careful scrutiny the courts used to con-
sider rules and facts that might clarify the appropriate resolution of Mar-
tin's ADA claim. The scrutiny the courts will apply to sports rules is
perhaps the most significant factor in determining which rules are funda-
mental to the sport, since the issue will arise when a prospective compet-
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing RULES OF GOLF, supra note 49, at App. 192)
80. Id.
81. The district court's selection of the observation that walking a golf course, about five
miles, expends only about 500 calories (less than a Big Mac), Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1896, must
be viewed as evidence regarding fatigue with some skepticism. And, indeed, the Court pur-
sues the other elements of fatigue, including stress and dehydration because of heat. Id.
82. The interactive process is found in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
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itor seeks accommodation from a resistant sports organization which by
its nature holds the authority to speak for the sport and its rules. The
rules are scrutinized by the court for their impact on the disabled athlete,
not left to the discretion of the defendant and rulemaking organization.
The process includes tradition along with other values of inclusion
and accommodation in accord with the spirit of the ADA. It is in sharp
contrast to the Olinger opinion, which endorses maintaining the sport as
it has always been played, a process that might approve the very discrim-
ination by intent or neglect that the ADA is intended to remedy. The
result may be seen as comparable to allowing an employer to exclude
blacks, Jews, or women from certain levels or types of employment be-
cause the employer, the coworkers, or the customers might be uncom-
fortable, inconvenienced, or hostile. To allow such a response trivializes
the complaint and the differences between participation and exclusion.
Refusing to apply the ADA to sports rules carefully and thoughtfully
implies, finally, that sports competition is not very important.
E. A highly capable athlete may nevertheless be a person with a
disability under the ADA.
In its Martin decision, the Court maintained its insistence, established
in the year 2000 employment decisions, that an ADA plaintiff must be
substantially impaired in a major life activity with the use or existence of
mitigating measures. Casey Martin's Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber syn-
drome has atrophied his right leg, impairs the flow of blood back to his
heart, and causes severe pain and anxiety about the risks of hemorrhag-
ing, developing blood clots, and fracturing his tibia.83
This, in itself, represents substantial impairment under the ADA.
Clearly, any athlete with a claim under the ADA must be substantially
impaired in a major life activity and yet be capable of performing at the
required level of competing with non-disabled competitors, with or with-
out reasonable accommodation.
Reasonable accommodation or modification also is limited under the
law. As applied to practices and procedures, a reasonable modification
must 1) make participation or benefit available to the person with a disa-
bility, and 2) cause no fundamental alteration. Thus, the cart gives
Casey Martin the opportunity, but has not assured that he competes suc-
cessfully. As applied to "auxiliary aids and services" (including equip-
ment or interpreters), an accommodation can be neither a fundamental
83. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
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alteration nor be an undue burden in expense to the public accommoda-
tion. Thus, if neither the golf course where a tournament takes place nor
the PGA have carts, it is less likely the PGA can be required to provide
carts to qualified people with disabilities because of the costs of acquisi-
tion and transport.
Interestingly, an eligibility rule that tends to exclude a qualified per-
son by reason of disability or prevent any person or class of people from
full and equal enjoyment, is prohibited discrimination unless it is neces-
sary in order to provide the "goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages or accommodations being offered."84 Typically, the assertion that
such a rule is "necessary" relies on the safety of participants in the main-
stream competition or the sheer impossibility of participation by people
with a specific disability unless a separate and modified competition is
established.
The extent of the accommodation was limited, according to the
Court, in that the accommodation cannot confer an advantage on the
person with a disability,85 nor can a change in rules or conditions provide
an advantage to all without (apparently) being a fundamental change in
the game.86 However, given the requirement of individual assessment,
the standard seems to require identifying an accommodation that is be-
lieved to have the correct effect. If such a determination can be made, it
must be made, not only when it is "easy."'87
F. The Impact of Casey Martin on the ADA
The ADA requires not only that people with disabilities have the op-
portunity to engage in a particular activity, be it employment, jury duty,
travel or recreation, but also to engage in the activity with people who
are not disabled. Statutory and case law that have dealt clearly with such
issues involve street paving and curbcuts that allow people using wheel-
chairs to utilize the sidewalks and the streets,88 and seating in theaters
and stadiums that must be dispersed to allow people with disabilities to
84. Id. at 1889 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
85. Id. at 1887-88 (citing Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251-52).
86. Id- at 1897.
87. I& at 1898 n.53.
88. See, e.g., Kinney v. Yerusalem, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring the city of Phila-
delphia to provide sidewalk curbcuts when a street is repaved, because the street and curb are
unified as interdependent facilities).
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sit with their companions and get a ticket at their preferred ticket price,
unless such a dispersal of seating simply is not feasible.89
The idea that sports are exempt from such requirements is advanced
in large part with the justification that sports are different from other
endeavors because of their elite nature, the purpose of which is to iden-
tify those who are physically most accomplished. The Court requires
that the purposes of the sport must be more narrowly or explicitly de-
fined. It deals with the legal argument that the PGA Tour is a private
club by recognizing that any person who can show that he (women are
not eligible) can play golf at a certain level of skill in the context of the
qualifying events (which are costly in entry fees, living expenses and
time) by recognizing that the purpose of the Tour is to make money for
the Tour. In these two senses, the PGA Tour differs radically in its at-
tributes from a private club, its membership and purposes.
Much more can be said about the intent to exclude certain persons
because of their commonly held and involuntary attributes, however.90
Many aspects of sports receive public funds, through subsidies, commu-
nity development, or support of education, or through public contribu-
tions for the building and infrastructure of facilities and their environs.
Recipients of federal funds must comply with Title II of the ADA or
with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, which also prohibit
discrimination on the basis of disability. Many sports teams and organi-
zations are employers of their athletes, and have no exemption from
ADA Title I prohibitions on discrimination. Thus, if an organization
such as the PGA Tour can carve out an exemption, it sets itself against
the prevailing norm for sports generally.
In the context of civil rights legislation from which the ADA
sprang,9' an argument for exclusion must be suspect, and finally, must be
allowed very sparingly. And, if some types of sports or sports organiza-
tions are to be exempted from anti-discrimination legislation, it is ac-
89. See, e.g., Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. 871 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C. 1994) cert.
denied sub nom. Hoskins v. Kinney, 511 U.S. 1033 (1994).
90. The Supreme Court has held that developmentally disabled persons are not a suspect
class and no heightened scrutiny is required for such chronically disabled people under the
Constitution. The sources of antidiscrimination law are statutory. See generally City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985) (holding that a reduction in benefits that is neutral on its face and does not
arise from discriminatory motive, yet has a disparate impact on a higher proportion of persons
with chronic disabilities than others, is acceptable under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
the predecessor of the ADA which applies only to recipients of federal funds).
91. See infra notes 92-112 and accompanying text.
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ceptable to society to give an exemption only if those sports are not very
important to society.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND ITS OFFSPRING, THE ADA
The ADA has its origins in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion and national origin,
and, by amendment, discrimination because of sex. 92 Though sometimes
controversial, the civil rights legislation has been widely enforced in the
courts and has changed the values of society. The federal legislation
prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities is the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973.91 The scope of the Act, a compromise with advocates
for broader protection of individuals with disabilities, is limited to fed-
eral agencies,94 federal contractors receiving substantial funds,9' and en-
tities receiving federal grants or participating in federal programs.96 The
Rehabilitation Act has provided a basis for important litigation estab-
lishing the rights of people with disabilities to work, travel and partici-
pate in government programs and civic activities. The Act and its
regulations provide many of the concepts and definitions later incorpo-
rated into the ADA.97
Yet, there is broad agreement that the implementation of the ADA is
encountering complexities and impediments absent under the prior laws.
Employers and public accommodations voice their dissatisfaction with
their assigned roles.98 Even the courts seem to be willing to bend the
law to avoid the full implementation of the ADA's provisions, as the
Supreme Court is criticized for doing in its year 2000 employment
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 706,791-795 (1994). The legislation originally used the term "handicap,"
but was amended to use the preferred term "disability."
94. Id. § 791.
95. § 793.
96. § 794.
97. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (defining "'individual with a disability' [as] any indi-
vidual who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or
results in a substantial impediment to employment"); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)-(k) (regulating enti-
ties participating in federal grants and programs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794 (commonly re-
ferred to as section 504) and defining "physical or mental impairment," "major life activities,"
"has a record of such an impairment," "is regarded as having an impairment" and "qualified
handicapped person"). Prohibited discrimination is defined at length in 29 C.F.R. § 104.4.
Regulations for section 504 are found in various sections of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions because several agencies have jurisdiction over funds allocated for various purposes.
98. With regard to sports, see, e.g., Capital Gang, supra note 12 ("The Americans With
Disabilities Act is such a muddle.... It has been so abused.., by alcoholics, agoraphobics,
and those are just the A's .... Congress really ought to tighten it up.").
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cases.99 Advocates for professional sports are only the latest of the con-
tentious chorus.
One apparent reason for the broad unrest arises from the political
presentation that enacted the ADA. Legislators and the public concen-
trated on Title I, envisioning the ADA as helping people with serious
physical disabilities who were unemployed because of prejudice or the
lack of modest matters of reasonable accommodation. The burden of
accommodation could be justified politically by the purpose of making
unemployed and isolated persons into competent, self-supporting work-
ers. Yet, the disabilities most frequent among ADA plaintiffs are back
problems and mental health conditions, rather than disabilities with
more objectively ascertainable symptoms such as, say, paraplegia. Fur-
ther, most Title I claims are brought by individuals who have jobs and
seek accommodations over the resistance of their employers, so the em-
ployer experiences a cost without any measurable benefit such as finding
a new competent employee. This begins to account for the hostility to
Casey Martin's case, even while there is much sympathy for Martin the
disabled golfer.
The analysis can be further developed. Professor Ruth Colker con-
ducted an extensive review of district court files of ADA cases.100 She
found that over ninety-three of ADA cases are decided for the defen-
dant,1' a finding that differs significantly from a tally of Rehabilitation
Act results, despite the similarity of the laws. Colker asserts that the
courts seem to be quick to dismiss the plaintiff with summary judgment,
"ignoring elementary principles of who bears the burden of proof."'0 2
The decisions for summary judgment in the district courts do in fact
seem poorly connected with the factual bases even as they are described
by courts in their opinions. 103 Colker theorizes that district courts are
unwilling to send ADA cases to juries, choosing instead to find no genu-
99. Barnes, supra note 17 (manuscript at 21-24, on file with author) (discussing Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc, 527 U.S. 516
(1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999)).
100. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99 (1999) (asserting that federal courts are unprincipled in their use
of summary judgments and disregard of EEOC regulations, to the disadvantage of ADA
plaintiffs).
101. Id. at 109 (stating that defendants prevail in over 93% of ADA claims, based on
substantial research by the author).
102. Id. at 102.
103. This author finds that students are often confused about the fact patterns summa-
rized in their casebooks, which follow a remarkable pattern: Summary judgment for the defen-
dant in the district court; affirmed by the court of appeals.
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ine issue of material fact, and decide the case as though the questions
were entirely questions of law.1
0 4
Other researchers suggest a possible reason for the courts' treatment
of the ADA, and reason for disapproval among some media commenta-
tors and members of the public who have only a sketchy sense of the
requirements of the law. Researchers Issacharoff and Nelson observe
that the ADA is a potent tool for the redistribution of wealth and oppor-
tunity. Its effects are far greater, they argue, than the Civil Rights Act,
or even the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.10 5 They assert that
the ADA's redistributive effects are overwhelming the justifications for
enacting the law, and that the "inherent uncertainty in the obligation to
provide 'reasonable accommodation'"10 6 creates for courts a reluctance
to follow the implications of the statute and regulations because the un-
derlying theory allocating costs to the employer is novel and
unexplained.0 7
The Civil Rights Act and amendments operate differently in that the
Act creates no independent measure of how much redistribution is ap-
propriate, in that any redistribution of wealth results from a judgment
finding unlawful discrimination. 0 8 That is, under older civil rights legis-
lation, a successful plaintiff is fully qualified for the benefit or role
sought; the only barrier is the defendant's unreasonable and unlawful
discrimination. The defendant must compensate the plaintiff for this
wrong.
ADA cases go beyond the finding of discriminatory motive or effect
and require redistribution of wealth by requiring that the defendant pro-
104. Colker, supra note 100, at 110-27. See also LAURA F. RoTHSMN, DISAILTY LAW
239-81 (2d ed. 1998) (giving a series of cases illustrating the provision and denial of accommo-
dations). The great majority (seven of ten) are decided on summary judgment at the district
court level, affirmed by the circuit court. The exceptions are brought under the Rehabilitation
Act. Two of the cases present facts that weigh heavily against the plaintiffs, both of whom
have bipolar illness and seek positions that are very sensitive and potentially dangerous to
themselves or others, yet the courts carefully examine the question of any reasonable accom-
modation that might enable the plaintiffs to fill the jobs they seek. The courts' careful scrutiny
of the facts in the distinguishing factor; with better facts, ADA cases nevertheless receive short
shrift.
105. Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination With a Difference: Can Employ-
ment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. Rnv.
307, 340-41 (2001). The theory resonates with Colker's concern to create awareness that ADA
litigation is erroneously characterized as a source of riches for plaintiffs. That is, employers
and the public perceive the ADA as a tool for employees and applicants to harass and bully
others into providing special treatment.
106. Id. at 310.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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vide accommodation to the plaintiff. 109 Thus, if an employer errone-
ously refused to reach agreement with an employee who is a person with
a disability, with regard to changes in work schedule, workplace barriers
or equipment, or other aspects of work that a court determines would
allow an employee to work and would not unduly burden the employer
and the employer's organization, 110 the employer is either compelled by
injunction to make accommodation or made to pay damages, or both. 1 1
Similarly, for public accommodations, failure to provide a requested ac-
commodation might be the basis for liability, though it may not be clear
whether the accommodation is reasonable.
Yet, the reasoning does not well support objections to suits like
Casey Martin's. He is a person with an objectively identifiable disability
with measurable and severe symptoms. Accommodation costs essen-
tially nothing, particularly given the resources of the PGA. Relatively
few others are likely to be at once substantially disabled and qualified to
play on the professional tour, as shown by the failure of both Martin and
Olinger to maintain their eligibility.
The apparent reasons for resentment of Casey Martin's ADA claim
run deeper into ideology. Casey Martin's resolve to play professional
golf has grown, by means of his ADA claim, to stand for a transfer of
resources from the property holder or public collective to an individual
because of need. Though Martin is not provided assistance that does
more than level the playing field, conservative observers see only that he
has received some benefit not given to others. This double vision of the
nature of the accommodation - objectionable in principle though it al-
lows participation - reminds us that the ADA is a civil rights statute that
prohibits the continuation of discrimination against an identifiable
group, no less than is the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
109. The classic civil rights discrimination case is similar to the relatively rare ADA claim
that an individual has a record of being a person with a disability or is regarded as being a
person with a disability. Unlike more typical ADA plaintiffs, those with such claims do not
need accommodation. Rather, like plaintiffs bringing race discrimination claims, they only
need the discrimination to stop.
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
111. Under the ADA, it would appear, the "regarded as" and "record of" prongs of the
definition of "person with a disability" are more similar to the simple, prejudice-based case of
employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Curiously, cases on these bases are relatively
rare, and seem to cause considerable confusion in the courts.
112. Since Casey Martin's request to the PGA and Ford Olinger's to the USGA, another
golf participant has been denied the use of a cart in a curious USGA decision. Lee
Penterman, a 38 year-old man with cerebral palsy, sought to caddie for a friend on the U.S.
Amateur Public Links Championship. Ira Berkow, Sports of the Times: The Sticky Wicket of
Caddies and Carts, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 2001, at D8. Penterman caddied for two rounds in
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IV. THE AGING OF BABYBOOMER ATHLETES
The aging revolution has already begun, as the average lifespan at
birth rose from forty-nine years in 1900 to seventy years in 1960, and to
seventy-nine years by 1997.113 Life expectancy at retirement age is, of
course, still older since premature deaths are eliminated from the calcu-
lations. In 1900, persons age sixty-five could expect to live about twelve
more years; in 2000, eighteen more years."' Perhaps the life expectancy
at age eighty-five is most startling. Women who reach age eighty-five
can expect to live an average of seven more years, while men live on
average about six.115
The older population's numbers rose rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s,
as a boom in medical technology created an unprecedented cohort of
survivors of previously fatal conditions. About thirteen percent of the
U.S. population, or thirty-five million people, are over traditional retire-
ment age. At present, while medical effectiveness continues to grow, the
growth of the population entering retirement is at a relative lull because
few babies were born during the Great Depression and World War II.
Beginning in 2010, the first of the babyboomers - those born after the
end of World War II and up to around 1964 - will enter their retirement
years. The retirement age population will grow rapidly until about 2030,
when about seventy million, or one in five people, will be age sixty-five
or older." 6 The population of the oldest old, whose very survival sug-
gests they are among the very fit born in their age cohort, will continue
to grow in number until 2050. A mere four million (two percent of pop-
ulation) today, those age eighty-five and over likely will number
nineteen million (five percent) in 2050.
which golfer Ben Flam competed successfully. Unable to undertake the third day of exertion,
Penterman rejoined Flar for the last two holes because Flam had fallen behind, but Flarn was
eliminated. Id While it appears that Penterman's presence may have had a positive influence
on Flarn and his game, there is no suggestion that the use of a cart by Penterman would have
had any effect on Flam. 'The report of his struggle to carry the clubs despite a limp and a
gnarled right hand in the heat of San Antonio clearly raises questions about the nature of the
USGA's thinking in denying a request that has no apparent impact on the skills of golf.
113. THE FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON AGING RELATED STATISTICS, OLDER
AMERICANS 2000: KEY INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 70 (2000) [hereinafter OLDER
AMERICANS].
114. Id.
115. ld.
116. Id. at 2.
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Due in part to extended old age, aging people are already beginning
to think in terms of active retirement. More people are working, 17 and
post-career "bridge" jobs between work and retirement are becoming
common. 8 Fewer look forward to a fully funded retirement 1 9 and the
Social Security "earnings test," which reduced retirement benefits due to
excess earnings, has been eliminated.2 0 By choice or by necessity, the
future of aging looks busier than did retirement of the past.
A. Aging, Activity and Athletic Interest
Awareness of the benefits of physical activity has already caused
older people to become more active. Between 1985 and 1995, the pro-
portion of older people reporting their lifestyle as sedentary dropped
from 34% to 28% percent among men and from 44% to 39% among
women. 121
Among currently recognized elderly athletes are an eighty year-old
swimmer, who sought treatment after a poor performance in a meet, had
a triple bypass, and has returned to her sport;12 2 a sixty-eight year-old
cyclist who has adult onset type II diabetes that is alleviated by his activi-
ties; 2 3 and a one hundred year-old track and field athlete who began to
117. Mary Williams Walsh, Reversing Decades-Long Trend, Americans Retiring Later in
Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at Al (The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the trend
to earlier retirement halted in the mid-1980s and recently reversed.); Alison Barnes, From the
Editor, 1 ELDER'S ADVISOR, Summer 1999, at iii-iv (citing Employee Benefits Research Insti-
tute Issue Brief 206 and a 1998 EBRI survey (Sixty percent of older respondents to 1998 study
said that a major reason to remain in the workforce after retirement age was they enjoyment
of work, and the desire to stay involved.)).
118. Joseph F. Quinn, Retirement Patterns and Bridge Jobs in the 1990s, in EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Issue Brief No. 206, at 1 (Feb. 1999); Mary Williams Walsh,
No Time to Put Your Feet Up As Retirement Comes in Stages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2001, at
Al.
119. Only an estimated 10% of workers in 2001 are able to take early retirement, because
of inadequate pensions and the need for health care coverage. Walsh, supra note 117, at Al.
A significant factor is the shift of retirement plans from defined benefits to defined contribu-
tions. Barnes, supra note 117, at iv. In the 1998 EBRI study, 38% of respondents identified
the need to earn to make ends meet, while 26% expected to support family members. Quinn,
supra note 118, at 18.
120. Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act of 2000, Publ. L. 106-182, § 2, 114 Stat. 198
(2000).
121. OLDER AMERICANS, supra note 113, at 33.
122. Doris Hicks, 80 Year Old Medalist Swimmer, AGEVENTURE NEWS SERVICE, availa-
ble at http://www.demko.com/cs001129.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
123. 68 Year Old Cyclist, Leo Weil: Active Aging Profile, AGEVENTURE NEWS SERVICE,
available at http:l/www.demko.com/csOO1017.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
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compete at age ninety-six.' 24 All compete in the senior division of their
sports, however, and some sports have very restricted divisions based on
age, e.g., in golf, the U.S. National Senior Sports Classic VI, age 90-94
division. It is unclear whether an older player could compete out of his
or her age group, presumably against persons with a competitive edge
due to relative youth.
The effects of increased activity among older people generally are
not well understood, but the positive effects of avoiding obesity and
maintaining muscle mass and strength are quite well established. The
benefits of exercise for the stiff and painful effects of osteoarthritis, for
example, have changed traditional advice for persons with this most
common affliction of later years.1'
Popular wisdom, and the proliferation of health clubs beginning in
the 1980s, suggests that babyboomers have developed unprecedented fit-
ness habits or efforts into middle age.'26 Yet, without a fully reliable
crystal ball, the most telling indicator of future feats by aging athletes is
the efforts of disabled athletes to date. A few examples include blind
golfers, runners, and climbers, 12 7 and athletes with loss of mobility in-
cluding a skier who has lost a leg, a climber with paraplegia who there-
fore climbs relying only on his arms, and hikers using crutches and
wheelchairs. 28 One hundred and three individuals competed in the
wheelchair division of the New York City Marathon. Most participate in
their sports by cooperating with able-bodied people for guidance and
assistance, or in a special division.
However, recent developments suggest the movement of athletes
with disabilities into the mainstream of sports events. In 2001, Maria
Runyan became the first legally blind track athlete to qualify for the U.S.
124. Harding Kneedler, M.D., 100 year old Track and Field Athlete, AGEVENTURE NEws
SERVICE, available at http://www.demko.com/csOO130.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
125. Nicholas A. DiNubile, Exercise for Osteoarthritis, in PHYsIcIAN AND SPORT-
SMEDICINE, July 1997, at 47, 47.
126. Indeed, the culture of the babyboomers' old age may differ more radically from the
past than the popular literature posits. Scholars discuss the arrival of a revision of the very
concept of the physical body beginning in the late 20th century, noting that fixed roles within
the life course have become blurred into a more fluid whole of life in which one's chronologi-
cal age and activities may no longer conform to traditional expectations. It is asserted that
inner body asceticism may no longer be incompatible with outer body hedonism. Thomas J.
Csordas, Introduction: The body as representation and being-in-the-world, in EMBODIMENT
AND EXPERIENCE 1, 2 (Thomas J. Csordas, ed., 1994).
127. Renee Tawa, Disabled Athletes Determined to Raise the Bar, L. A. TIMES, June 11,
2001, § 5, at 1. One of the athletes described in the article, Erik Weihenmayer, also skydives
and scuba dives.
128. Id.
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Olympic Team. Diana Golden, an amputee due to cancer, is the first
disabled skier to regularly compete in nondisabled events. Two hundred
runners from a group for runners with disabilities participated with the
mainstream of runners in the 2000 New York City Marathon, and rou-
tinely participate in other mainstream events. '
While the stories are in themselves inspiring, these athletes' activities
are subject to criticism for incurring cost and forcing change similar to
the commentary on the Martin decision. Hikers on the Appalachian
Trail endure criticism for the cost of their 4.6 mile hike to a cabin
adapted for accessibility."2 9 The costs were estimated at thirty to fifty
thousand dollars, and the team, which included a majority of able-bodied
hikers, took twelve hours to cover a trail that ordinarily takes four or
five hours.13 0 Blind runners and climbers typically require the assistance
of non-disabled companions working closely with them. The reaction of
opponents seems to be based in the question "If this requires so much of
so many, why not do something else?" The question ignores the drive
that animates many athletes with disabilities.
Many are moderate in their goals, asserting that they have no desire
to go beyond the mainstream of recreational athletes.13 1 This may be
viewed as a form of evolving political correctness a mere decade after
the enactment of the ADA. An instructive analogy can be drawn with
the evolution of accommodation and mainstreaming in education. With
the passage of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in the late
1970s, federal funds and a mandate for inclusion were directed to public
primary education, creating a group of students with learning and other
disabilities (and parents of those students) who expected accommoda-
tion and knew how such measures might be implemented. In the mid-
1990s, these students began to appear in colleges and universities in
numbers and to require the accommodations that had facilitated their
education in primary and secondary schools. The number of discrimina-
tion claims against universities jumped, though the law requiring accom-
modation had been in effect since 1974.132
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (Blind runner simply does not want to be confined to Braille marked trails, or
indoors). The director of public education of the National Federation of the Blind believes
the examples of elite blind athletes illustrates the difficulty of daily life for the blind, rather
than inspiring others to pursue elite mainstream sports. Id.
132. Virtually all colleges and universities are subject to the Rehabilitation Act of 1974,
because some part of the school or the students receives federal assistance. In the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Congress clarified that all parts of a higher education institution are
subject to the Rehabilitation Act if any part of the institution receives federal funds. 20
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Similarly, athletes with disabilities are now and will continue to show
how they can participate in the mainstream. Many will be younger than
the babyboomers, who will discern their similar interests only as the im-
pairments of aging threaten to exclude them from their sports. Over the
next decade, the numbers of exceptional athletes will continue to grow,
and the expectation that people with disabilities often can compensate
for the typical human capabilities they lack and excel at specialized phys-
ical skills, is gaining a public face.
B. The ADA and the Aged Athlete
The ADA's protection is limited to those with chronic, rather than
acute and curable conditions.133 Chronic health conditions are those
caused by some type of disease or trauma and not subject to cure.
Rather, the debilitating, often progressive, symptoms of such a condition
might be treated for better short- or long-term function. Thus, an indi-
vidual denied employment or access to services because of a broken leg
does not have a claim under the ADA, while a person with an atrophied
leg, like Casey Martin, does.
All individuals suffer from some chronic health conditions, although
among younger people the symptoms often have not reached a threshold
level of detectability or limitation of function that causes complaint or at
least recognition. Common chronic conditions include arthritis, diabe-
tes, cancer, high blood pressure, and heart disease.3
Some chronic conditions are the result of survival of traumatic diffi-
culties. Younger people more often suffer traumatic injury, resulting in
loss of major organs or limbs. With improvements in medical technol-
ogy, including trauma intervention and maintenance of individuals with
chronic disabilities, those individuals with compromising conditions are
more likely to live to old age.
U.S.C. § 1681 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The ADA also applies to higher education, with Title II
generally covering public institutions and Title III, private institutions.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)
Physical or mental impairment means: (1) any physiological disorder, or condition, cos-
metic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lym-
phatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
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While some conditions clearly arise from disease, others might be
natural conditions of aging by a healthy individual.135 For example, the
range of hearing pitch typically narrows with age beginning in child-
hood. 13 6 Similarly, the onset of farsightedness after age forty is consid-
ered an unavoidable result of healthy aging, perhaps a chronic
condition. 13 7 In contrast, many impairments seem to be caused by pro-
gressive diseases, including impairments of vision, hearing, nonspecific
pain, and paralysis of extremities. For example, a study of cardiovascu-
lar health in a group of elderly people showed that about a third had
clinically detectable symptoms of disease, one third had subclinical indi-
cations that disease existed, and one third had no symptoms. 138
Clearly, chronic conditions that rise in incidence in the population
with advancing age can cause substantial impairment in major life activ-
ity, sufficient for a claim under the ADA. However, it may be difficult to
determine whether a persistent condition in an older person is the result
of disease, age, or a combination of the two. 139 Further, there is no
formula for determining when debility due to decades of sedentary lifes-
tyle, alcohol use, and overweight is more likely a chronic disease condi-
tion or simply a bad habit with physical consequences. While it is
135. Sharon A. Jackson, The Epidemiology of Aging, in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC
MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY 203, 203 (William R. Hazzard et al., eds. 4th ed. 1999).
136. In one study, 411 of 1000 aged white individuals and 252 of 1000 blacks had hearing
deficiencies. Id. at 207
137. See, e.g., Thomas S. Rees et al., Auditory and Vestibular Dysfunction, in PRINCIPLES
OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY, supra note 135, at 617, 631 (stating that loss of
hearing ability is widespread among older people, and the etiology of age related hearing
dysfunction is frequently difficult to determine); Robert E. Kalina, Aging and Visual Function.
in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY, supra note 135, at 603,603 (not-
ing that many changes in vision in later life are universal, inevitable, and currently
untreatable).
138. Jackson, supra note 135, at 218.
139. Robert S. Schwartz & David M. Buchner, Exercise in the Elderly: Physiologic and
Functional Effects, in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY, supra note
135, at 143, 143-48 (stating that changes that have been noted with advancing years include
loss of endurance (about 1% per year between the ages of 30 and 70); loss of cardiovascular
fitness resulting in symptoms similar to hypertension, probably due to increasing stiffness in
veins and arteries; and decrease in strength and power (at an average 1-2% per year between
the ages of 30 and 79, and possibly doubling beyond age 70)). Originally believed to be inevi-
table, the reasons for these changes are now in doubt primarily because it is difficult to sepa-
rate them from the effects of changes in activity over decades. Also, researchers no longer
believe there is a limit on the effects achievable through training to a previously sedentary
individual, regardless of age. Training elders for physical fitness has shown that changes in
their muscle size yields greater changes in strength than in younger adults. Finally, the results
suggest the importance of a factor that is well known to athletes: the importance of neural
function, the mental component of performance. Id. at 149.
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tempting to say that the more severe impairments of function are proba-
bly associated with disease, even that assertion might be debated for the
growing population of centenarians who experience a range of condi-
tions we do not yet consider to be a symptom of any specific disease.
It is unclear whether the differences between conditions due to
healthy aging can create a cause of action under the ADA. The EEOC
regulations on employment discrimination suggest that any substantially
impairing condition might be sufficient, since an individual is considered
to be substantially impaired in the major life activity of working if he or
she is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the aver-
age person having comparable training, skills, and abilities.140 However,
the Supreme Court in employment cases has denied the validity of
agency interpretation of the definition of disability because it appears
first in a section of the statute that precedes Titles I through II.41 The
Court therefore has decided it does not need to give any deference to
the agencies charged with drafting regulations for each Title. 42
Thus, at present we can only observe that there exists (now and most
likely in the future) some population of aging people who have chronic
conditions (i.e., disease caused symptoms) that substantially impair them
in major life activities (of "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working").143
An individual need not be impaired in the sport he or she wishes to
pursue; rather, the requirement of substantial impairment is a threshold
question that must be answered in the affirmative in order to trigger the
protection of the statute. The elder plaintiff under the ADA must be a
person with a disability, substantially impaired in a major life activity;
must be otherwise qualified to compete (by fulfilling steps to be consid-
ered as a participant, for example);' 44 and must be seeking some accom-
modation or consideration for accommodations that would allow
qualifying and competition on a "level playing field" with non-disabled
competitors. The accommodation cannot be an undue burden or hard-
ship for the sports organization, and the plaintiff cannot pose a direct
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
142. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
143. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The major life activities are the same for each Title of
the ADA.
144. A plaintiff need not, however, fulfill such administrative requirements if doing so
clearly would be futile. Rendon v. Florida, 930 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
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threat to the health or safety of others when considered individually
based on recent information and the best objective information.
V. THE FUTURE OF ACCOMMODATION IN SPORTS
Martin opens the door, but does not provide a map for the evolution
of sports toward reasonable accommodation. Yet, there are some devel-
opments that might be anticipated by reviewing some of the rules and
circumstances of sports. It is well worthwhile, considering the extraordi-
nary effort and skills of those who can compete as qualified people with
disabilities in the mainstream of sports and a concern for the importance
and integrity of sport.
The following addition to the discussion of this article is not intended
to explore all the nuances of the rules of the games discussed, but merely
to observe the values and reasoning of the courts and some sports. It
does not propose that the courts necessarily would decide in favor of
changes resisted by defendant sports organizations. Rather, it explores
the possibilities to which the Supreme Court might have opened a door
to various means of accommodation to assure equal participation in
many sports by persons with disabilities. To the possible accommoda-
tions suggested below, many could add others that might be made by
their own sports.
A. Sports and Unequal Competitors
A number of sports deem that equal circumstances among the play-
ers are not key to the competition by engaging in handicapping. A hand-
icap generically is the practice, in a race or contest, of imposing an
artificial disadvantage on a supposedly superior contestant, or an artifi-
cial advantage on one supposedly inferior, in order to equalize the
chances of winning.' 45 The assessment of the capability of a player usu-
ally is based on the player's record at similar competition. The purpose,
it might be inferred, is to recognize the inherent inequality of all compet-
itors, to allow for interesting and challenging competition in which the
outcome is in doubt, and to see who has the better day, round, or race.
Golf, with its handicapping formula, is a sport that officially recog-
nizes, and institutionalizes, the calculation of handicaps. In USGA
handicapping, for example, "a player's handicap is determined by a
formula that takes into account the average score in the [ten] best of the
golfer's [twenty] most recent rounds, the difficulty of the different
145. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 526 (10th ed. 1998).
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courses played, and whether or not the round was a tournament.' '1 46
Bowling also bases handicap on scoring experience.
Handicapping can be more complicated, taking into account factors
only suggested by the requirements of the competition. Sailing, for ex-
ample, utilizes handicaps to equalize competition between boats of dif-
fering specifications. By handicapping intended to equalize the boats,
the sport rules imply that the sailing crew is being tested against the ele-
ments to determine whether the crew singly and collectively is having
the better day at their sport. Thus, the boat is just equipment like a golf
club or a baseball bat, and its speed can be factored out of the race by
the handicap. An inference to be drawn is that the sailors' greatest chal-
lenges are the weather and the sea, and themselves. Though more com-
plex in its calculation, the handicap is considered to be a standard under
which the participants must compete. A similar inference might be
drawn regarding the golfer and the course at the very time of play, the
conditions and the state of mind being the greatest challenges to success.
Each of these sports seeks to determine who is showing the greater
concentration and skill given their own resources. A revision of thinking
about handicapping, broadening the concept to recognize accommoda-
tions that have already been made or may be made for players with disa-
bilities, is a significant step in the reasoned application of the ADA. The
following subparts of this article consider aspects of sports rules that ac-
commodate unequal competitors, applying the terms of the ADA to ac-
tions that have been or might be taken to allow direct competition. Not
incidentally, the discussion includes instances in which the traditionalism
of sports precludes routine competition.
1. Divisions of Unequal Competitors
The ADA requires that a qualified athlete with a disability be al-
lowed to compete with other athletes. 47 That is, the rules of eligibility
must not tend to exclude the competitor unless necessary.' 48 No analysis
exists clarifying what is necessary in order to justify establishment of a
separate division.'49 Rather, the existence of some categories, such as
gender-based and age-based divisions, have been assumed to be appro-
146. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897 n.44.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
148. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(C)).
149. But see, e.g., Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Center v. City of West Palm
Beach, 846 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding under Title II of the ADA that a city pro-
gram that has a goal of recreational services to groups with differing abilities, but experiences
severe funding cuts cannot cut only higher cost services to persons with disabilities). Rather,
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priate and, perhaps, better for the presumptively less capable partici-
pants.150 A separate division for persons of similar disabilities might be
created, like the wheelchair division of a marathon. 151
Yet, with time and experience, the likely disadvantage of one group
with regard to the other group, can be calculated in a manner upon
which an entire sport relies. For example, a prevalent handicapping sys-
tem establishes differences in the competition as played by men or by
women. 15 2 Again, golf provides an example. In addition to the handicap
calculation, golf provides different tee boxes for men and women.
15 3
The women's tee typically requires several fewer yards on the first shot
to reach a similar lie for the ball. One typically asks no further questions
about the nature of the adjustment, since it is widely understood as a
generalization that a male athlete of equal age and training with a female
athlete will have greater upper body strength and hit farther.
Yet, despite both golf handicaps and separate tees, the men's and
women's divisions remain separate.154 The reasons relate to tradition
and certain prejudices in favor of males who traditionally had the funds
and leisure for golfing in an economically and racially highly stratified
society.' 55 It is, of course, possible that the continuing divides relate not
to individual preferences, but to a triumph of tradition over declared
the city must, with public participation, seek an equitable distribution of cuts to the program.
Id. at 991-92.
150. The phenomenon of the Senior Olympics is well established, and has thousands of
participants. About the NSGA, NATIONAL SENIOR GAMES AssOCIATION, available at http://
www.nsga.com. Similarly, the Special Olympics provides games exclusively for persons with
developmental disabilities. Oath, Mission & Philosophy, SPECIAL OLYMPICS, available at
http://www.specialolympics.orglaboutspecial-olympics/aboutsoi.html.
151. Although originally advanced as a separation necessary to the safety of all partici-
pants, the "wheelchair division" is perhaps better justified by the fact that the fundamental
activity of the traditional marathon is running.
152. This article does not intend any inference that femaleness in itself is a physical or
mental disability. Perhaps the better view is that many or most sports were made up by men.
and are therefore poorly adapted to the greater strengths of the female population. In any
case, no conclusion such as female inferiority is intended.
153. And, where applicable, for championship golfers, a difference that might add extra
hazard or other difficulty.
154. However, a made-for-TV sports event with pairs of the best male and female golfers
was aired on July 30, 2001. Tiger Woods and Annika Sorenstam played David Duval and
Karrie Webb. Charles McGrath, Mixed Greens: Why Don't Men and Women Play Golf To-
gether?, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2001 (Magazine), at 16. Woods and Sorenstam won.
155. Id. (noting that women experience much unfavorable treatment in golf that is not
warranted by differences in the quality of play).
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values associated with other activities in society. Nevertheless, golf pro-
vides the way for persons of unequal capability to play together. 156
Other types of equalizing have appeared in other sports. In team
sports that includes inter-gender competition such as soccer, for exam-
ple, where male and female players must alternate shots in order to pro-
vide a fair competition between the teams with opportunity for
participation by all players.
2. Auxiliary Aids and Services
The ADA requires that auxiliary aids and services be provided to a
qualified person with a disability'57 provided it is neither a fundamental
change to the activity nor an undue burden.
A review of disabled athletes in competition suggests that the assis-
tance of a person is often an important component to compensate for a
disability. Blind runners, for example, listen to sighted runners who de-
scribe the course and footing over the distance of the race. Blind climb-
ers listen to the observations of sighted climbers and may follow the
sound of a bell to indicate the area of terrain to follow. Blind golfers
utilize the instructions of sighted assistants. All these examples of
human assistance have been included by the organizers of sport. This
author would assert that the accommodation has been largely noncon-
troversial because it is believed that the words of an assistant cannot
possibly approach the value of precision of sight when making a golf
shot, running a trail, or climbing a mountain. 58
A potentially more controversial use of auxiliary services is in cueing
the athlete. A simple example is the deaf runner poised at the start of
the race, who cannot hear the gun. The athlete seeks an accommodation
to participate in the race. There is little doubt that such an accommoda-
tion must exist, since the mechanics of the start have little bearing finally
on the running of the course, and because a starting sign that is as pre-
156. Id. (asserting that golf as no other game provides the calculations for men and wo-
men to compete, and observing that they very rarely do).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
158. The difference between direct competition and such endurance sports as climbing is
recognized. One reason to include them here is the suggestion sometimes made that the
achievements of an athlete with a disability should be recorded with an asterisk, presumably
with notation regarding the type of assistance that compensated for the disability.
This controversy is being played out in matters of academic and professional testing, where
accommodations of extra time or assistance is frequently given to learning disabled or sensory
disabled students. If the accommodation is indeed calculated to "level the playing field," it
appears that any notation regarding accommodation does a disservice to the person with a
disability and to the validity of the calculation of the accommodation.
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cise and instantaneous as the starting sound is easy to imagine, whether
it be the flash of a light or a tap on the shoulder. 159
More complex and controversial is the accommodation of a deaf ath-
lete, usually because the complexity of the information or the delivery
suggests the possibility of providing some suggestion of advantage. For
example, the deaf football quarterback must receive visual signals, either
within the helmet devices or from the sidelines, to know the play. Typi-
cally, such communication can be generated by a sign language inter-
preter (or the input of a transcribing program) for a coach's instructions.
The precise effects of such an accommodation are not known, 160 yet it
seems that the means of communication could be devised to duplicate
the aural instructions the player ordinarily would receive.
An interesting question of auxiliary aid and fundamental skills in-
volves a young Florida golfer who was barred from local competition
because autism prevented him from keeping his own score. 161 The
USGA disagreed, saying that while keeping one's score is important, it is
appropriate for others to help a golfer with such a disability keep his
score. 162 The ruling suggests that golf is fundamentally a physical under-
taking and, if the game goes well enough, questions about the player's
mental or emotional perceptions are irrelevant.
The question of auxiliary aids, i.e., equipment and non-human assis-
tance, to accommodate a person with a disability, has been accepted in
many forms in many sports. For a runner's lost leg, for example, there
has been to date no challenge to the use of a prosthesis in running or
skiing. These athletes are neither diverted to a separate event nor re-
quired to participate without the aid.
Yet, in golf, one who uses non-conforming equipment cannot post a
handicap that would enable the player to move up in the ranks. Baseball
players in the major leagues would be prevented, under current rules,
from using metal bats, rather than wood, though metal can be used in
lower levels of competition.
159. It is useful to ask Waterstone's questions here: Is this (i.e., hearing) something the
athlete trains to do? Is it something a person in the general population can do? Waterstone,
supra note 29, at 1534. Since the answer is clearly negative, the method of starting the race is
simply a functional matter.
160. A question may be raised about whether the deaf player has an advantage during
stressful moments because he is not distracted by the noise and excitement of the crowd, but,
of course, that does not determine whether the accommodation is reasonable.
161. Bob Buttitta, Child with Autism Adds Twist to Debate, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, July
15, 2001, at C13.
162. Id.
[Vol. 12:67
THE AGING ATHLETE
Explanation of the difference between what is allowed by the sport
and what is rejected has been attempted by the current disability advo-
cacy community: "It may be bio-mechanically impossible for a disabled
person to perform the same kind of movement patterns.' 1 63 To some
extent the characterization is correct, but it is ignored when the "bio-
mechanical movement" is clearly more difficult, such as running on an
artificial leg."6
B. When are Arbitrary Rules Fundamental?
Commentators speak with dread of the extension of accommodation
thinking to giving a hypothetical disabled runner or swimmer a head
start to compensate for, say, slowed reflexes or arthritic joints.1 65 The
reasons offered are, however, elusive. Finally, it appears that the diffi-
culty in definition is a disagreement regarding the nature of funda-
mentality.' 66 Some would assert that rules that are quite arbitrary but
fundamental include the height of the hoops in basketball and the dis-
tance between the bases. 67 Yet, the theory seems as unsuccessful as the
163. Tawa, supra note 127, § 5, at 1 (quoting Doug Pringle, executive director of Disabled
Sports USA - Far West).
164. Clearly, artificial legs that include powered assistance to the athlete's efforts are be-
yond the scope of this article. Sports must screen for such devices, as they do for drugs and
hormones that enhance trained performance.
165. DiNubile, Exercise for Osteoarthritis, in PHYsIcIAN AND SPoRrsMEDIcrNE, supra
note 125, at 47 (noting that revised medical opinion regarding the common impairment of old
age, osteoarthritis, calls for regular exercise preferably avoiding stress on weightbearing
joints). Swimming is such an exercise.
166. Waterstone, supra note 29, at 1534. In pursuing the distinction between funda-
mentality and reasonable accommodation, Waterstone poses the following questions:
(1) Does the Rule involve a skill that an athlete in the particular sport trains to do? (2)
Is this particular skill unique to an athlete in the sport, or is it a task that the general
population can perform? (3) What is the link between success in the skill the rule tests
for and success in the sport? (4) Would the rule modification place other athletes at a
competitive disadvantage? (5) Why does the league have this rule? (6) Would the rule
modification change the way the game is played for all participants? (7) What is the
realistic administrative and financial burden on the association in determining whether
or not to waive this rule on a case-by-case basis?
Id. While this author does not endorse the answer to these questions, however interrelated
and overlapping, as the correct answer to the question of fundamentality, the questions never-
theless shed much light on the matter.
167. Id. at 1537 (seeking to identify "a bedrock tenet of the game," and asserting that
certain rules have no impressive explanation but that should not degrade their importance).
In Parent, supra note 28, at 135, PGA Tour Commissioner Tim Finchem is quoted from a Feb.
2, 1998 press conference regarding the differences between tournament and recreational golf:
"Could we envision in any sport different rules for different players? If there is anything
fundamental about athletic sport it is that you have the same rules for all the competitors.
You bring your physical attributes and I bring my physical attributes to the playing field or the
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Supreme Court's in providing a guide about which rules fall in that cate-
gory 168 because it leaves a wide range of rules that might be based on
negligent discrimination, a harm that the ADA specifically prohibits.
An alternative view of such "rules of the road" 1 69 is that changing a
rule for a player with a disability cannot change the game for players
without disabilities without making a fundamental change in the game.
Thus, the example of the height impaired basketball player1 70 who seeks
accommodation in the form of moving the line for a three point shot
closer to the basket seems at first look to be non-fundamental because
another line can designate where players of ordinary height stand to
make their free throws.1 71 In contrast, a three-point shooter using a
wheelchair would not have a right to such accommodation. 172 Though
such a player could have exclusive use of the special line if it equalized
the amount of skill needed to shoot from a chair, the game nevertheless
would be fundamentally changed because the defense would need very
different strategies to proceed with the game.
Using such reasoning, it appears that there are likely to be more fun-
damental rules for team sports than for sports in which the principal
competition is against one's own perceptive and physical limitations.
Certain sports presented as direct competition, however, might be better
viewed in this context as independent competition. This probably in-
cludes racing sports in which the competitors primarily race the clock,
despite the fact that the events of starting and finishing draw great inter-
est from spectators. The argument that motivation requires that all run-
ners start from the same point does not stand, considering that races
conducted on an oval track can have staggered start lines and races often
are run in heats.173
Timing is an important aspect of sport, and while changes to timing
might be considered to be fundamental to the game, not all timing must
be so. Many aspects of sports are carefully timed for reasons relating to
oval track or the ski slope or the football field or the baseball field, and we play by the same
set of rules."
168. Waterstone, supra note 29, at 1537.
169. Id.
170. Note, however, that the height-impaired basketball player is not substantially im-
paired in a major life activity (unless perhaps suffering from some serious condition attributa-
ble to severely impaired growth), and thus in reality has no claim under the ADA.
171. Waterstone, supra note 29, at 1538.
172. Feinstein, supra note 14, at 13A.
173. One might even argue that the sixty-second clock is not fundamental, since a simple
accommodation for the slowed capabilities of aged, disabled racers could be a slower clock to
equalize the opportunity to compete with athletes in their prime.
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the flow of play for the media or other factors. An example is the ten-
second clock for a basketball free throw.17 4 If, because of slowed re-
flexes or other disability, a player can shoot only with a twelve- or fif-
teen-second clock, it is difficult to argue that the change would
fundamentally change the game. 75 The accumulation of seconds affects
both teams equally in terms of rest and recovery; strategy is not signifi-
cantly affected.
An example raised in the media as a potential accommodation that
might be imposed by the ADA is the designated hitter rule, 76 which
allows teams in the American League to have a player who does not play
a field position, but only hits and runs the bases. The rule allows a team
to keep a valuable player whose hand/eye coordination still allows a
competitive hit, though running speed and other fielding skills are di-
minished by age. 17 7 The existence of the rule in the American League
might suggest that hitting and pitching are fundamental to baseball but
fielding is not. That conclusion is not unavoidable, however, since there
is no requirement that National League baseball and American League
baseball share the same fundamental rules, as do the PGA Tour and
USGA.
Thus, the American League and National League with regard to this
requirement play different games. Or, perhaps an additional factor rele-
vant to the fundamentality of a rule is whether the player eliminated
from competition because of lack of accommodation has another em-
ployer or employers who can provide comparable opportunities for play.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sports are about who is the better player, and competition between
players hones the skill of the competitor and the achievement repre-
sented by the sport. All competitors differ, in dimensions, strength, en-
durance, concentration, strategic thinking, and team-enhancing ability.
Those who assert that the purpose is competition of course are correct.
174. Waterstone, supra note 29, at 1535; Capital Gang, supra note 12 ("[S]ports rules are
arbitrary. Why three bases? Why three strikes? Why the height of the basketball hoop?").
Some advocates for the independence of sports argue simply that the rules are arbitrary, i.e.,
of concern to no one but those who organize the sport. However, professional sports - most
likely to argue for exemption - are also big business, and business clearly is subject to antidis-
crimination law because issues of employment and entertainment and role models are criti-
cally important to society.
175. Waterstone, supra note 29, at 1535.
176. Broder, supra note 11, at 3.
177. Id.
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Those who assert that the purpose is inclusion, competing together as
well as against one another, also are correct. 178
Sports enthusiasts who oppose accommodation for qualified athletes
with disabilities are not just choosing whether sports are primarily per-
formance or participation. They are defining performance very nar-
rowly. Indeed, one might consider the push for exclusion at its most
extreme, by rules that prevent athletes from utilizing any modern aid: no
lenses, a simple diet, and herbal remedies.
Resistance to accommodation is about mistrust of authority, which
ultimately must impose a solution. It is more likely that devotees of a
sport will accept the decision of the sports organization that traditionally
sets the rules, but as the designated hitter rules shows, that is no guaran-
tee of acceptance.
With regard to the coming elder athletes, sports like golf that involve
extended periods of light exercise and have a very significant mental
component, are most likely to attract numbers of older sports enthusiasts
as competitors. Further, if an equalizing strategy already is implemented
without legal compulsion, it is more likely to be inferred that similar or
related changes are not fundamental to the sports activity.
Athletes with disabilities will be competitors, and not all will seek
special divisions for their competition. As Trey Holland, USGA Presi-
dent cryptically said: "I believe this human endeavor will be what de-
fines the fact of the USGA over the next ten to twenty years." So, also,
for all sports.
178. Jim Abbott, Sports are a Way of Belonging, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at A27 (ac-
knowledging love of golf and its respect for rules and etiquette; asserting that the beauty of
golf lies in the fact that it is a game the player plays against himself, and that the sport has a
right to enforce its own rules; but asserting that excluding a person because of a permanent
disability is no benefit to the game).
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